Recent empirical evidence indicates that two inflation thresholds exist in the inflation-growth relationship. Pre-existing theoretical models, however, fail to generate such a pattern. By adding non-productive consumption loans into a standard model of informational imperfection, this paper finds that an increase in the inflation rate may increase, decrease, or have no significant effect on economic growth for inflation rates below a threshold level; however, for inflation rates higher than this threshold level, an increase in the inflation rate significantly reduces economic growth. Moreover, the marginal impact of an increase in the inflation rate in terms of reducing economic growth is increasing along with the rise in the inflation rate, until the inflation rates reach another threshold level, from which such a marginal effect significantly decreases. These results accord well with recent empirical evidence.
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Non-productive consumption loans and threshold effects in the inflation-growth relationship
Introduction
Ever since the seminal work of Tobin (1965) , the effect of inflation on capital investment and economic growth has long been one of the important topics in macroeconomics.
Theoretically, depending on how money is introduced into the model, the early literature has established that an increase in the inflation rate may lead to an increase [as in Tobin (1965) where money is a substitute for capital in the portfolio], a decrease [as in Stockman (1981) where capital investment is subject to the cash-in-advance constraint], or have no effect [as in Sidrauski (1967) where money enters into the utility function] on capital investment and economic growth. On the other hand, early empirical studies report a mixed correlation between inflation and economic growth, until recently where numerous studies have found non-linear correlations between inflation and economic growth. Fischer (1993) first points out a possibility that the effect of an increase in the inflation rate on economic growth may differ at low levels and high levels of inflation. Specifically, by choosing 15% and 40% inflation rates as the break points, Fischer (1993) finds that an increase in the inflation rate leads to an increase in economic growth for inflation rates below 15%; however, such an increase results in a reduction in economic growth for inflation rates above 15%. Moreover, the marginal (and negative) impact of an increase in the inflation rate on economic growth is substantially lower for inflation rates above 40% than for those between 15% and 40%. Consequently, there may exist two inflation thresholds under which the effect of an increase in the inflation rate on economic growth changes.
By adopting the break points proposed by Fischer (1993) , Barro (1997) presents a negative correlation between inflation and economic growth for all ranges of inflation; however, the coefficients of the inflation rates in the growth regressions are equal to -0.023 for inflation rates below 15%, -0.055 for inflation rates between 15% and 40%, and -0.029 for inflation rates above 40%. In a sense, Barro's (1997) finding is very consistent with Fischer (1993) , as there may be two inflation thresholds in the inflation-growth relationship. 1 Indeed, according to Barro's (1997) result, the marginal effect of an increase in the inflation rate in reducing economic growth is small for inflation rates below the first threshold level as well as for inflation rates 2
The only difference between Barro (1997) and Fischer (1993) is the inflation-growth correlation for inflation rates below 15%. Ghosh and Phillips (1998) also exhibit a pattern of the inflation-growth relationship that is very close to Fischer (1993) . In contrast to Fischer (1993) , whose break points are picked based on judgment, Ghosh and Phillips (1998) employ a panel regression to allow for a non-linear specification and find a positive correlation between inflation and economic growth for very low levels of inflation rates (around 2-3% a year). For other levels of inflation rates, however, there is a negative correlation between inflation and economic growth, corroborating the existence of the first inflation threshold. Moreover, the negative correlation is convex -namely, that the marginal impact of an increase in the inflation rate in reducing economic growth is higher for inflation rates between 10% and 20% than for those between 40% and 50%, implying that a second threshold level does exist. Khan and Senhadji (2001) and Burdekin, Denzau, Keil, Sitthiyot, and Willett (2004) also confirm Ghosh and Phillips's (1998) findings. 2 While the aforementioned studies reach an agreement on the existence of two inflation thresholds, they disagree on the inflation-growth correlation for inflation rates below the first threshold. Such a disagreement, in fact, can also be found from other empirical studies. Bullard and Keating (1995) find that an increase in the inflation rate leads to an increase (a decrease) in economic growth for low (high) levels of inflation. Along the same lines, Sarel (1996) uncovers an 8% threshold level of inflation, so that an increase in the inflation rates leads to a significant reduction in economic growth for inflation rates above the threshold level. For inflation rates below this threshold level, inflation has an insignificant effect on economic growth, or it may display a slightly positive effect. Khan and Senhadji (2001) , using a newly-developed econometric technique to re-examine this issue, find that a above the second threshold level. If inflation rates are located in-between the first and second thresholds, then inflation has a relatively large impact on economic growth. 2 In particular, Figure 2 in Khan and Senhadji (2001) replicates the inflation-growth relationship that we just outlined. Burdekin, Denzau, Keil, Sitthiyot, and Willett (2004) examine the inflation-growth correlation for developing countries. They find that the first threshold level of inflation is 3% while the second one is 15%. significant threshold relationship exists between inflation and economic growth in a way similar to that found by Sarel (1996) and Ghosh and Phillips (1998) . 3 In Bruno and Easterly (1998) the negative correlation between inflation and economic growth is only observed with high levels of inflation; for low levels of inflation, there is no cross-country correlation between inflation and economic growth.
To sum up, recent empirical studies have found two inflation thresholds in the inflation-growth relationship. Specifically, an increase in the inflation rate may increase, decrease, or have no significant effect on economic growth for the inflation rates below the first threshold level. Once the inflation rates are greater than the first threshold level, inflation displays a significant negative effect on economic growth, with the marginal (negative) impact of an increase in the inflation rate on economic growth substantially decreasing when the inflation rates are greater than the second threshold level. While recent empirical studies have confirmed the existence of two inflation thresholds, pre-existing theoretical models fail to generate such a pattern for the inflation-growth relationship.
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The purpose of this paper is to develop a model that is able to yield such a pattern for the inflation-growth relationship and thereby provide a possible theoretical explanation.
Ideally, a model that is able to yield such a pattern in the inflation-growth relationship should contain two opposite effects of an increase in the inflation rate on economic growth, for example in the following way. The positive effect may dominate (be dominated by) the negative one at low (high) levels of inflation (the first inflation threshold) and, for high levels of inflation, the difference between these two effects is significant until inflation rates are greater than another threshold level, from which this difference diminishes along with an increase in the inflation rate. To yield a positive effect of inflation on economic growth, however, is not so obvious, considering that there is a consensus that inflation has an adverse effect on resource allocation and is thereby detrimental to capital investment and economic growth.
3 Khan and Senhadji (2001) find that this threshold is lower in developed countries than in developing countries.
By adding non-productive consumption loans into a standard model of informational imperfection, this paper is able to generate a positive effect of inflation on economic growth.
As pointed out by Modigliani (1986) , informational problems in the financial markets may result in credit rationing of consumption loans, which prevents consumers from borrowing as much as they would like to reach their optimal consumption profile. It turns out, as modeled by Jappelli and Pagano (1994) , that credit rationing of non-productive consumption loans may force the economy to save more resources for capital investment and thereby facilitate economic growth. We then follow Bose (2002) by assuming that money is needed for loan transactions between lenders and borrowers. Under this framework, we find that inflation impedes bank lending activity for the purpose of consumption (household credit) so that an inflation rate increases the incidence of credit rationing of consumption loans, which, as modelled by Jappelli and Pagano (1994) , is beneficial to capital investment and economic growth. Consequently, the presence of non-productive consumption loans gives rise to a positive effect of inflation on economic growth.
The coexistence of positive and negative effects of inflation on economic growth allows us to capture two inflation thresholds in the inflation-growth relationship. Specifically, an increase in the inflation rate leads to a rise in the incidence of credit rationing of both investment and consumption loans. While an increase in the incidence of credit rationing of investment loans is detrimental to capital investment and economic growth, such an increase in relation to non-productive consumption loans facilitates it. The presence of non-productive consumption gives rise to another channel through which inflation may affect capital investment and economic growth. This can be observed by the fact that an increase in the inflation rate leads to an increase in the loan rate. Since the amount borrowed by consumers (the quantity of consumption loans) is related to the present value of their old-age income, an increase in the loan rate decreases the quantity of each consumption loan, which increases the amount of resources available for capital investment and is thereby beneficial to capital investment and economic growth.
The net effect of an increase in the inflation rate on economic growth depends on the two opposite effects mentioned above. We find that the effect arising from consumption loans may dominate (be dominated by) that from investment loans for low (high) levels of 5 inflation, resulting in the first inflation threshold.
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Furthermore, for inflation rates above the first threshold level, the magnitude of the effect from investment loans is increasing in the inflation rate while the magnitude of the effect from consumption loans is first decreasing and then increasing in the inflation rate. As the marginal impact of inflation on economic growth is the difference between these two, this implies that the marginal impact of inflation on economic growth is first increasing in the inflation rate and then decreasing, leading to the second inflation threshold.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and Section 3 describes the equilibrium loan contracts for the purpose of investment and consumption. In Section 4 we first obtain the equilibrium growth rate and then examine how a change in the inflation rate affects the equilibrium rate of economic growth. We also compare our results with recent theoretical studies. Section 5 concludes.
Description of the Model
The economy consists of an infinite sequence of three-period-lived overlapping generations (OG).
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Each generation is of identical size and composition, and contains two kinds of risk neutral agents: lenders and borrowers. Borrowers are further classified into two groups of equal size: entrepreneurs and consumers. For simplicity, the populations of lenders, consumers, and entrepreneurs are normalized to n, m, and one, respectively.
Behavior of Agents
A young lender, endowed with one unit of labor, cares only about his old-period consumption;
hence, he will sell his labor to firms to generate wage income and save this income for old-age consumption. Each young lender is endowed with a constant-returns-to-scale (CRTS) technology that can convert one unit of time t output into Qε ( 1 ε < ) units of time 5 More specifically, for inflation rates below the first inflation threshold, an increase in the inflation rate increases (decreases) economic growth if the effect from consumption loans is greater (less) than that from investment loans. If the difference between both effects is not large, then there is no significant correlation between inflation and economic growth for inflation rates below the first threshold. A time-t young lender can simply save his wage income by means of this CRTS technology for his old-age consumption. Alternatively, young lenders can extend loans to borrowers in return for time t+2 output. As is the case in Azariadis and Smith (1996) , it is assumed that there are financial intermediaries that attract deposits from lenders and offer loans to borrowers.
Entrepreneurs care only about old-age consumption. An entrepreneur is endowed with one unit of labor as well as an investment project in his second period of life. The investment project is risky, and according to its probability of success can be classified as either high-risk (type-H) or low-risk (type-L). Note that entrepreneurs are not endowed with any output; hence, external funding is necessary for an entrepreneur to implement his project.
Following Bose (2002) , a young entrepreneur must apply for a loan (from an intermediary) during his first period of life, even though he needs the external funding during middle age.
A middle-aged entrepreneur who obtains a loan from the intermediary can operate his investment project using his own labor to convert one unit of time-t+1 output into Q units of time-t+2 capital, with probability p i , i=H, L. With probability 1-p i , the operation of the project fails and nothing is produced. By assumption, 0 1 for a low-risk entrepreneur than for a high-risk one. As will be seen, this assumption makes the separating equilibrium emerge.
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We also follow Bose (2002) by assuming that a middle-aged entrepreneur has access to a storage technology that can convert one unit of time-t+1 output into one unit of time-t+2 output.
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Thus, if a low-risk entrepreneur is rejected in regard to a loan, he can engage in the home production and store the proceeds for his old-age consumption.
Each consumer borrower cares about consumption in his second and third periods of life.
Consumers have no endowment in the first period; however, with a non-negative probability, each consumer will be endowed with one unit of labor in his final period of life. We assume that the structure of consumers is similar to that of entrepreneurs, namely, that there are two types of consumers and that consumers' types (private information) refer to the probability of getting one unit of labor when old. Specifically, with probability i p , i=H, L, a type-i consumer will receive one unit of labor in the old period and, with probability 1 i p − , the consumer will be endowed with nothing. Similar to entrepreneurs, 0 1 
As indicated by Bose (2002) , the assumption that different types of borrowers with different opportunity costs are denied credit ensures the "single crossing properties" of the indifference curve in the contract plane.
10 The low-risk entrepreneur can engage in home production in his second period of life if his loan application is rejected. The entrepreneur, however, cares only about old age consumption. Hence, Bose (2002) implicitly assumes that the low-risk entrepreneur in middle age has access to a storage technology. It should be noted that this storage technology is not accessible to young borrowers, so that young borrowers must hold money. See below.
it is clear that type-L consumers have a lower opportunity cost of being denied credit than do type-H ones.
Without a loss of generality, it is assumed that each entrepreneur can operate a firm.
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The old borrower can utilize capital that he produced himself and/or rent capital from other old entrepreneurs and lenders, plus hire young lenders and old consumers (who obtain labor endowment) as labor input to produce output. The output production in time t is given as
where t ψ denotes the average capital stock per firm and k t and L t are the capital stock as well as labor employed by the firm, respectively. Capital depreciates fully after production.
In the capital market equilibrium, each firm employs the same amount of capital; hence, t ψ =k t . Moreover, following Bose and Cothren (1996) and Bose (2002) , it is assumed that 1 σ α = − , implying that the output production technology is linear as in the Ak model.
Labor and capital are competitive so that the wage rate (w t ) and the rental rate of capital ( t ρ )
at time t are given as
and
As will become clear, the per-firm labor employment is constant over time under separating equilibrium in the loans market. Hence, the rental rate of capital is constant over time (which is denoted as ρ ) as in the Ak model. 
Financial Intermediation, Money, and Loan Transactions
We assume that lending/borrowing is intermediated.
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It is also assumed that each young lender can establish an intermediary without incurring any cost. The assumption of free entry into the intermediary activity ensures competitive behavior among intermediaries, 11 In other words, the number of firms is normalized to 1 -an assumption also made by Bose (2002) .
12 Labor employment includes young lenders and old-consumers who obtain one unit of labor endowment.
Hence,
which will drive the intermediary's profits to zero.
It should be recalled that borrowers need external funding during their second period of life while lenders wish to save while still young. As a result, borrowers must contract with financial intermediaries when they are young. Once a young borrower at time t obtains a loan from an intermediary, he must exchange it for money in the same period and then use the money to buy output in the next period for capital investment or consumption. Moreover, the operation of each financial intermediary is subject to a reserve requirement policy that requires that each young intermediary hold a µ (1 0 µ > > ) fraction of total deposits in the form of money between time t and t+1.
14 At the beginning of time t, each young borrower applies for loans from a young intermediary. Once a young intermediary reaches an agreement with a borrower, he must offer a deposit contract to young lenders. Suppose that a young intermediary at time t agrees to offer q t units of time-t output to a borrower at time t. Then, in order to fulfill the borrower's need, the intermediary must also offer a deposit contract at time t to young lenders that attracts /(1 ) The demand for money originates from the young borrowers (who want to store their loans in the form of money) as well as the young intermediary (who needs to hold money to satisfy the reserve requirement).
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Following Bose (2002) , the government accomplishes any monetary injection by a lump-sum transfer to old lenders and borrowers; hence, the suppliers of money at any point of time include these agents (old lenders and borrowers) plus the middle-aged intermediaries (who hold money as a reserve requirement during their young period in life). On the other hand, young borrowers (who obtain loans) and young 14 For simplicity, the young intermediary is an intermediary operated by a young lender. 15 In Bose (2002) , young lenders who intend to lend to borrowers need to hold money. We have modified our model to be consistent with Bose (2002) in such a way that young lenders, instead of young borrowers, need to hold money. The conclusion derived below, however, does not change. The results are available upon request.
intermediaries (who are required to hold money) must hold money.
Denote t δ as the fraction of total wage incomes of time-t young lenders that are lent to young borrowers (via intermediaries). The market-clearing price (P t ) is then determined by an equation similar to Bose (2002) , which can be written as
As stated by Bose (2002) , w t is proportional to k t (eq. (2)), which is predetermined in time t-1, and P t-1 , 1 t δ − , w t-1 , and 2 t w − are also predetermined. Therefore, the inflation rate is determined by the change in monetary injections (or withdrawals) as well as by the ratio of the reserve requirement µ . As both are policy variables determined by the monetary authority, we follow Bose (2002) by treating the inflation rate, denoted by 1 τ + , as a policy variable.
Loan Markets and the Equilibrium Contracts
We shall now determine the equilibrium contracts for investment and consumption loans.
At the beginning of each period, each time-t young intermediary must decide whether or not to finance borrowers after receiving deposits. To finance the borrower, the young intermediary announces one set of contracts intended for entrepreneur borrowers and the other set for consumer borrowers. If a young intermediary's offer is not dominated by others, then he is approached by potential young borrowers. Since money is needed in loan transactions, the contract terms offered by the intermediary must take the inflation rate into account. After the completion of loan transactions, the intermediary offers a deposit contract to young lenders and attracts deposits to fulfill the needs of borrowers.
As in Bencivenga and Smith (1993) , the equilibrium loan contracts at time t are defined such that there is no incentive for any intermediary to offer an alternative contract, taking w t , w t+2 , 2 t ρ + , 1 τ + (the inflation rate), and other intermediaries' offers as given. We also 16 Recall that the population of lenders is equal to n and each lender is endowed with one unit of labor when young. Hence, young lenders' total wage income amounts to follow Bencivenga and Smith (1993) and Bose (2002) by focusing on the separating equilibrium such that an intermediary offers contracts that separate borrowers according to their type. Before determining the equilibrium contracts for entrepreneurs and consumers, we first specify the equilibrium loan rate for both types of loans and the deposit contract extended to young lenders.
The Deposit Contract and the Equilibrium Loan Rates to Borrowers
Competition ensures that each intermediary earns zero profit from lending/borrowing.
Recall that the rate of return from lenders' CRTS technology between time t and t+2 is Qερ .
The intermediaries' zero-profit condition implies that the rate of return in relation to the deposits between time t and t+2 must be equal to Qερ , the rate of return on the lenders' CRTS technology. 
The zero-profit condition for each intermediary in terms of lending/borrowing activity is 17 We have assumed that the young intermediary is asked to hold the money between time t and t+1. If the intermediary is required to hold the money for two periods, then the rate of return from money is equal to ( 1 ) ( 1 )
which further implies that ,
(1 ) (1 )
An increase in the inflation rate leads to an increase in the loan rate. This result is quite intuitive, because money is needed for loan transactions, but is inessential for lenders' CRTS technology. Note that the expected return to an intermediary from lending to entrepreneurs should be equal to that from lending to consumers; otherwise, one type of loan will disappear.
In other words, eq. (6) should be offered to both entrepreneurs and consumers.
Equilibrium Contracts to Entrepreneurs
As in Bencivenga and Smith (1993) and Bose (2002) π ∈ is the probability with which an intermediary offers the loan. Given this, a generation-t entrepreneur's expected utility at time t+1 is , , ,
for a type-L entrepreneur and is , , , 
The LHS of eq. (9) 
Under the separating equilibrium, at least one of equation (9) or equation (10) must hold with the strict inequality.
To determine the equilibrium contract intended for entrepreneurs, it should first be noted that the entrepreneurs' capital technology is linear (in the case of success); hence, each will intend to implement his project at the maximal scale.
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As pointed out by Bencivenga and Smith (1993) 
We focus on the case where the parameters satisfy , 1 e t L π < ; hence, some type-L entrepreneurs are denied loans and are thereby credit rationed. By substituting the terms of 20 The condition for the equilibrium contract into eq. (10), we can verify that eq. (10) holds with a strict inequality, which proves that the separating equilibrium indeed exists.
It is instructive to examine how a change in the inflation rate influences the terms of the contracts extended to entrepreneurs. Note that ,
indicating that an increase in the inflation rate (1 ) τ + reduces the probability of type-L entrepreneurs obtaining a loan. This is so because a change in the inflation rate has an asymmetric effect on the loan rates in relation to type-H and type-L entrepreneurs, which exacerbates the problem of asymmetric information and thereby raises the amount of credit rationing in regard to good (type-L) borrowers. Moreover, it is easy to verify that 2 2 , 2 3 
We also assume that 
The Equilibrium Contract to Consumers
The equilibrium contract extended to consumers shares a similar feature with that extended to entrepreneurs. Specifically, the contract offered by a lender to a type-i 
The self-selection conditions that prevent type-H consumers from pretending to be type-L consumers and vice versa are given respectively by , , 2 
for a type-H consumer and , , 2
for a type-L one.
To obtain the equilibrium contracts, we first assume that c β is sufficiently small so that each type of consumer will likely borrow all of his expected old-age income for 
One can easily verify that 
Inflation, Capital Formation, and Economic Growth
After we obtain the equilibrium contracts for consumers and entrepreneurs, we can examine the correlation between inflation and economic growth. Once we obtain this correlation, we will compare our result with recent theoretical studies.
The Non-linear Correlation between Inflation and Economic Growth
Recall that borrowers may not apply for loans if the initial levels of inflation are too high.
Under such circumstances, capital is converted by means of lenders' CRTS technology. On the other hand, for relatively low levels of inflation, capital investment is affected by the equilibrium contracts extended to entrepreneurs and consumers. To examine how the joint consideration of investment and consumption loans affects the inflation-growth relationship, we should focus on the inflation rate 1 τ + that is less than (1 ) . In other words, both entrepreneurs and consumers are willing to borrow.
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From the equilibrium contracts, we can see that the total amount used in consumption loans at time t is equal to , , , 
The first part of the RHS of eq. (18) is the amount of capital produced by lenders' CRTS technology while the second part is that produced by entrepreneurs' investment projects.
By substituting eq. (2) into eq. (18) and after performing some algebraic manipulations, we obtain the rate of economic growth between time t and t+1 (denoted as g ) which is given
To see the effect of a change in the inflation rate on economic growth in this case, we take logs of both sides of eq. (19) and differentiate them with respect to 1 τ + , which gives rise to ln ln ln (1 )
where ,
and ,
It is obvious that ln / (1 ) quantity effect, such that an increase in 1 τ + induces entrepreneurs to borrow more resources (in order to obtain t w at time t) and this thereby reduces the amount of resources available for capital produced by lenders' CRTS technology. This is captured by the terms
(1 ) /(1 ) τ ε µ − + − in the numerator of eq. (21) (with the presence of a reserve requirement).
The second one is related to the quality of investment loans such that an increase in 1 τ + reduces the probability of more efficient capital borrowers (i.e. type-L entrepreneurs) getting a loan ( , e t L π ). As both are detrimental to economic growth, the value of ln / (1 )
A change in 1 τ + similarly gives rise to quantity and quality effects on the value of c E . An increase in 1 τ + increases the loan rate, which reduces the quantity of each consumption loan. This quantity effect, however, increases the resources available for producing capital using the CRTS technology. The quality effect is observed by the fact that
π , the probability of more efficient consumers (type-L consumers) getting a loan. Note that the quantity effect is represented by the term [
where the last equality is obtained by using eq. (11'). Note also that is positive and independent of 1 τ + .
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To determine the effect of an increase in 1 τ
where
( (1 )
where 2 (1 ) 0 (1 ) [ (1 ) We find that the second and third effects dominate the first effect for low levels of the inflation rate; hence, the sign of To better illustrate our above analyses, we resort to numerical simulations. To do so, first note that capital's income share (α ) is roughly 0.33. The reserve ratio varies quite a lot across countries, ranging from 0.05% to 25%. 30 There is no empirical evidence for choosing other parameters, however. Since our purpose is to illustrate the existence of two inflation thresholds, we intend to choose other parameters that can produce a case consistent with recent empirical evidence. Specifically, we choose other parameters to reproduce the empirical evidence by Ghosh and Phillips (1998) that the marginal impact of inflation on economic growth decreases substantially. This case is consistent with Barro (1997) .
Discussion
We have shown that adding non-productive consumption into a standard model of asymmetric information can yield two inflation thresholds in the inflation-growth relationship that is consistent with recent empirical studies. It is worth noting that recent theoretical studies by Azariadis and Smith (1996) , Huybens and Smith (1999) , and Bose (2002) successfully capture some aspects (but not all) of this pattern of non-linearity in the inflation-growth relationship. In a neoclassical growth model, Azariadis and Smith (1996) consider an overlapping generations model incorporated with private information. It is shown that credit rationing arises in investment loans for high levels of inflation rates, and an increase in the inflation rate in this case exacerbates informational problems. 34 As a result, inflation tends to increase the total amount of credit rationing on investment loans for high levels of inflation and is thereby detrimental to capital investment. 35 For low levels of inflation, however, credit is not rationed and in this case an increase in the inflation rate increases the total amount of investment loans, which facilitates capital investment. Consequently, their model is able to explain the existence of the first threshold level of inflation in the relationship between inflation and the steady-state capital stock.
Nevertheless, the possibility that inflation has a negative or insignificant effect on economic growth below the first threshold level does not appear in their model. Similarly, the second threshold level does not exist.
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34 Azariadis and Smith (1996) consider the possibility that the lenders may apply for loans if the rate of return on capital investment is too low. In such a case, the lenders must employ storage technology (with a constant rate of return) in order to save. In a model where money is a close substitute for capital loans, Azariadis and Smith (1996) show that an increase in the inflation rate, which decreases the deposit rate, will raise the lender's incentive to pretend to be a borrower. To prevent this, an incentive constraint arises such that the size of the investment loans must decrease. It is shown that this incentive constraint is not binding for low levels of inflation so that an increase in the inflation rate simply increases the size of the investment loans and thereby facilitates capital investment. However, for high levels of inflation, this incentive constraint is binding and therefore an increase in the inflation rate reduces the size of each investment loan, which is detrimental to capital investment.
35 Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999) also develop a theoretical model whereby the inflation-growth correlation depends on the agents' degree of risk aversion. Since the degree of risk aversion is not correlated with the inflation rate in the model, their model may not capture the empirical evidence as does Bullard and Keating (1995) . Boyd and Smith (1998) develop a neoclassical growth model in an OG model with the presence of asymmetric information. They find two steady states in a monetary economy:
one with a low capital stock and output while the other has a high capital stock and output.
An increase in the money growth rate increases the steady state capital stock under the low-capital-stock steady state. However, such an increase in the high-capital-stock steady state reduces the steady state capital stock. Consequently, their model implies that the relationship between the money growth rate and the steady state capital stock depends on the initial capital stock. This is obviously not consistent with recent empirical work, which reports that the correlation between inflation and economic growth depends on the initial inflation rate.
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Huybens and Smith (1999) examine a model with a costly-state-verification problem.
They show that an increase in the inflation rate always leads to a reduction in real activity and, in particular, this negative correlation appears more pronounced at higher rates of inflation.
Similarly, Bose (2002) extends the framework of Bose and Cothren (1996) by showing that an increase in the inflation rate increases the amount of credit rationing on investment loans and is thereby detrimental to economic growth. Moreover, he finds an inflation threshold such that the borrowing regime switches from rationing to screening. Given that inflation exacerbates the problem of asymmetric information to a greater extent in the screening regime than in the rationing one, his work is able to capture the empirical fact that the negative effect of inflation on growth is less (more) pronounced in low (high) levels of inflation. While both studies are able to capture the fact that the marginal impact of an increase in the inflation rate on economic growth increases along with an increase in the inflation rate, their models are not able to yield the second threshold level under which the marginal effect decreases substantially. Moreover, the possibility that an increase in the inflation rate may lead to an increase in economic growth for low levels of inflation rates also growth, the second threshold level found by Azariadis and Smith (1996) may not be related to recent empirical evidence.
disappears.
Conclusion
This paper extends the work of Bencivenga and Smith (1993) and Bose (2002) by adding non-productive consumption loans into a standard model of informational imperfection in order to examine the threshold effects in the inflation-growth relationship. Without considering consumption loans, an increase in the inflation rate always leads to a reduction in the rate of economic growth, as obtained by Huybens and Smith (1999) and Bose (2002) .
However, the inclusion of consumption loans gives rise to an opposite effect of inflation on economic growth.
We find that the effect arising from consumption loans may dominate (be dominated by) that arising from investment loans for inflation rates below the first threshold level of inflation. For inflation rates above the first threshold level of inflation, we find that the difference between these two effects is increasing in the inflation rate for inflation rates below a second threshold level of inflation and decreasing in the inflation rate for inflation rates above this second threshold, ensuring the existence of the second threshold level in the inflation-growth relationship. These observations accord well with recent empirical evidence on the inflation-growth relationship. (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 )[ ] 1
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 
